The Aporetic Ground of Revelation’s Authority in the Divine Comedy and Dante’s Demarcation and Defense of Philosophical Authority by Aleksander, Jason
                                                    Access Provided by St Xavier University at 05/30/11  6:38PM GMT
Chapter 1 The Aporetic Ground of Revelation’s 
Authority in the Divine Comedy and 




Essays in Medieval Studies 26 (2010), 1-14. © Illinois Medieval Association. Published 
electronically by the Muse Project at http://muse.jhu.edu.
Nothing could be clearer for the interpreter of Dante’s writings than his 
concern for defending the independence of secular political authority against 
ecclesiastical encroachments. In Purgatorio 16, very near to the literal center of 
the entire Commedia, Dante’s pilgrim begs a Lombard, Marco, to point out the 
cause of the world having become “‘tutto diserto d’ogne virtute … e di malizia 
gravido e coverto’” (“‘totally deserted of any virtues … gravid with and covered 
with malice,’” 58-60).2 To this Marco responds that the fault lies not in the heav-
ens, not in that “‘greater power and better nature’” (“‘maggior forza e … miglior 
natura,’” 79) to which humans are subject, for:
 “Se così fosse, in voi fora distrutto
 libero arbitrio, e non fora giustizia
 per ben letizia, e per male aver lutto.” (Purgatorio 16.70-73)
[“If it were so, in you would be destroyed free will, and it would 
not be justice to have joy for good and mourning for evil.”]
Rather, Marco explains, 
 “Ben puoi veder che la mala condotta 
 è la cagion che ’l mondo ha fatto reo, 
 e non natura che ’n voi sia corrotta. 
 Soleva Roma, che ’l buon mondo feo, 
 due soli aver, che l’una e l’altra strada 
 facean vedere, e del mondo e di Deo.
 L’un l’altro ha spento, ed è giunta la spade 
 col pasturale, e l’un con l’altro insieme 
 per viva forza mal convien che vada 
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 però che, giunti, l’un l’altro non teme.” (103-105)
[“You can well see that bad leadership is the cause that has made 
the world rotten, and not nature that in you is corrupt. Rome, 
which made the good world, used to have two suns that made 
visible the one road and the other, of the world and of God. The 
one has extinguished the other, and the sword is joined to the 
shepherd’s staff, and entirely forcing the one together with the 
other goes badly, for, joined, the one does not fear the other.”]
Although Marco’s insistence on the importance of the independence of the 
sword from the staff could not be clearer, in articulating this view, Marco’s speech 
draws upon an understanding of human nature that is made more explicit in the 
Monarchia. Here, in the last chapter of his most important and sustained discussion 
of political philosophy, Dante reveals the fundamental philosophy underpinning his 
thought in all of its other manifestations—religious, political, poetic, etc.—when he 
states that the human being, “solus inter omnia entia in duo ultima ordinetur, quo-
rum alterum sit finis eius prout corruptibilis est, alterum vero prout incorruptibilis” 
(3.16.6) [alone among all beings is ordered [by] two ultimate goals, one of them 
being his goal as a corruptible being, the other his goal as an incorruptible being;, 
my emendation].3 Indeed, this principle grounds what Dante calls an “ostensive 
proof ” of the independence of temporal and spiritual authorities: 
Duos igitur fines providentia illa inenarrabilis homini proposuit 
intendendos: beatitudinem scilicet huius vite, que, in operatione 
proprie virtutis consistit et per terrestrem paradisum figuratur; 
et beatitudinem vite ecterne, que consistit in fruitione divini as-
pectus ad quam propria virtus ascendere non potest, nisi lumine 
divino adiuta, que per paradisum celestem intelligi datur…. Nam 
ad primam per phylosophica documenta venimus, dummodo illa 
sequamur secundum virtutes morales et intellectuales operando; 
ad secundam vero per documenta spiritualia que humanam 
rationem transcendunt, dummodo illa sequamur secundum 
virtutes theologicas operando, fidem spem scilicet et karitatem. 
. . . Propter quod opus fuit homini duplici directivo secundum 
duplicem finem: scilicet summo Pontifice, qui secundum revelata 
humanum genus perduceret ad vitam ecternam, et Imperatore, 
qui secundum phylosophica documenta genus humanum ad 
temporalem felicitatem dirigeret. (3.16.7-10)
[Ineffable providence has thus set before us two goals to aim 
at: i.e., happiness [beatitudo] in this life, which consists in the 
exercise of our own powers and is figured in the earthly paradise; 
and happiness [beatitudo] in the eternal life, which consists in 
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the enjoyment of the vision of God (to which our own powers 
cannot raise us except with the help of God’s light). . . . We at-
tain the first through the teachings of philosophy, provided that 
we follow them putting into practice the moral and intellectual 
virtues; whereas we attain the second through spiritual teachings, 
which transcend human reason, provided that we follow them 
putting into practice the theological virtues, i.e., faith, hope, and 
charity. . . . It is for this reason that man had need of two guides 
corresponding to his twofold goal: that is to say the supreme Pon-
tiff, to lead mankind to eternal life in conformity with revealed 
truth, and the emperor, to guide mankind to temporal happiness 
[felicitas] in conformity with the teachings of philosophy.]4
So, in short, the Monarchia offers a philosophy of human nature espousing three 
main principles. First, there are two distinct and ultimate teloi of human action, one 
is directed to a temporal and earthly beatitude; the other is directed to an eternal 
and spiritual beatitude. Second, achieving happiness insofar as is possible for us 
in our temporal existence, depends upon following the independent guidance of a 
universal, secular monarch in conformity with the teachings of philosophy. Third, 
eternal happiness (salvation) depends upon God’s grace, but must also be pursued 
by attending to the guidance of spiritual teachings that transcend human reason and 
help us cultivate the theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity.
Given that the passages cited above from both the Monarchia and the Com-
media support the reading that Dante’s utmost political concern lies in defending 
temporal political authority against ecclesiastical encroachment, it is tempting to 
assume that Dante would also refuse to subordinate the earthly goal of human nature, 
to which we are guided by philosophy, to the spiritual goal, to which we are guided 
by revelation. And, at first glance, there are passages in the Commedia that would 
appear to justify this assumption. For instance, in Paradiso, when John the Apostle 
asks what authority compelled his will to aim at the Good, Dante’s pilgrim appears 
to confer equal standing to philosophical arguments and the authority of revelation:
 E io: “Per filosofici argomenti 
 e per autorità che quinci scende
 cotale amor convien che in me si ’mprenti.” (Paradiso 26.25-27)
[And I said: “Philosophical arguments and the authority that 
descends from here must imprint in me such a love.”] 
However, when we turn to Dante’s Convivio, we find that, with respect to the 
earthly end of human action, Dante describes the possible effect of the love of 
Lady Philosophy as a secondary happiness subordinate to a primary happiness: 
Poi quando dico: “Sua bieltà piove fiammelle di foco,” discendo 
ad un altro piacere di Paradiso, cioè della felicitade secondaria 
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a questa prima, la quale della sua biltade procede. (3.15.11)5 
[Then when it [the second canzone] says: “Her beauty rains 
down little flames of fire,” it descends to another joy of Paradise, 
namely to the happiness secondary to the primary happiness, 
which derives from her beauty.]
While these passages seem to suggest an inconsistency in Dante’s attitude towards 
the relationship between philosophy and revelation, I believe that Dante’s under-
standing of the relationship between revelatory authority and philosophical authority 
is, in fact, remarkably consistent throughout his post-exile writings. Moreover, and 
more to the point of this specific paper, I hope to show that the most significant 
feature of Dante’s understanding of the relationship between these two authorities 
can best be understood by examining the ways in which his attempts to construct 
a linkage between them stands on the aporetic ground of revelation’s derivation 
of its own authority from that of philosophy. 
In order to see how the attempt to construct this linkage works, however, 
we must begin by examining why the relationship between the authorities of 
philosophy and revelation involves different considerations than are involved in 
Dante’s subordination of earthly beatitude to spiritual beatitude. With respect to the 
relationship between our two beatitudes, one reason Dante offers for the necessity 
of the subordination of earthly beatitude to spiritual beatitude, is that our intellect 
is severely limited with respect to our natural capacity to know the essences of the 
separated substances.6 For instance, just before the passage from Convivio 3.15 
cited above, Dante writes 
Poi, quando si dice: “Elle soverchian lo nostro intelletto,” 
escuso me di ciò, che poco parlar posso di quelle per la loro 
soperchianza. Dove è da sapere che in alcuno modo queste cose 
nostro intelletto abbagliano, in quanto certe cose [si] affermano 
essere, che lo ’ntelletto nostro guardare non può, cioè Dio e la 
etternitate e la prima materia: che certissimamente si veggiono 
e con tutta fede si credono essere, e pur quello che sono intender 
noi non potemo, se non cose negando si può apressare alla sua 
conoscenza, e non altrimenti. (3.15.6) 
[Then when it [the second canzone] says: “They overwhelm 
our intellect,” I excuse myself by saying that I can say little 
about these things because of their transcendency. Here we must 
observe that in a certain way these things dazzle our intellect, 
insofar as certain things are affirmed to exist which our intellect 
cannot perceive (namely God, eternity, and primal matter), things 
which most certainly are known to exist and are with full faith 
believed to exist. But given the nature of their essence we cannot 
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understand them: only by negative reasoning can we approach 
an understanding of these things, and not otherwise.]
And in the Commedia, Dante repeatedly insists that human beings are incapable 
of knowing or judging as God does. For instance, the images of both Thomas 
Aquinas in Paradiso 13 and the Eagle of divine justice in cantos 19 and 20, tell 
us that no created intellect is capable of knowing in the way that God does and 
that, consequently, judgments that would require such a knowledge are illicit for 
human beings.7 Similarly, Peter Damian also tells us in Paradiso 21 that no cre-
ated intellect—not even the highest among the ranks of the angels—is capable of 
perceiving the entirety of God’s providential plan for the world. In short, meta-
physical speculation is not in and of itself the path to either spiritual or earthly 
beatitude; rather, if metaphysical speculation amounts to anything at all, it is made 
licit only on the condition that one has already achieved salvation. Thus it would 
seem that Étienne Gilson was right to point out that “the thesis which Dante here 
maintains is quite extraordinary for the Middle Ages. Taken literally, it amounts 
to the maintenance of the primacy of ethics over metaphysics.”8 Moreover, even 
when we acknowledge that the pilgrim is often depicted as receiving (presumably 
by means of sensation or imagination) a direct and unmediated revelatory insight 
into the essences or quiddities of things that are beyond the legitimate scope of our 
speculative capacity, these depictions also tend to suggest a general subordination 
of our earthly beatitude to spiritual beatitude. 
However, when we turn to passages (especially in the Commedia) in which 
Dante confronts the relationship, not between the two ends of all human action, 
but between the authorities of philosophy and revelation with respect to practical 
guidance towards these ends, a different consideration emerges. For instance, in 
Purgatorio 22, Dante, through his images of the Roman poet Statius (whom, con-
trary to any historical evidence, Dante represents as having secretly converted to 
Christianity because of a revelation received by reading Virgil’s fourth Eclogue), 
suggests that, because of the providential ordering of human history, even a pagan 
poet like Virgil can guide others to Christianity:
 Ed elli a lui: “Tu prima m’invïasti 
 verso Parnaso a ber ne le sue grotte, 
 e prima appresso Dio m’alluminasti. 
 Facesti come quei che va di notte, 
 che porta il lume dietro e sé non giova, 
 ma dopo sé fa le persone dotte, 
 quando dicesti: ‘Secol si rinova; 
 torna giustizia e primo tempo umano, 
 e progenïe scende da ciel nova.’ 
 Per te poeta fui, per te cristiano.’” (64-73)
[And he [Statius] to him [Virgil]: “You first sent me to Parnassus 
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to drink from its caves, and you first illuminated my way to God. 
You did as one who goes at night, who carries the lamp behind 
and does not benefit from it, but teaches the people who follow 
when you said: ‘The age turns new; justice returns and the first 
human time, and a new progeny descends from heaven.’ Through 
you I was a poet, through you a Christian.”]
Indeed, this passage introduces the perplexing view that Virgil’s poetry has a greater 
capacity to guide others to Christianity than that of Statius, for even though Virgil 
is a pagan and lacks the faith that would be necessary for salvation, unlike Statius, 
his own ethical perfection (see Inferno 4.34-42) frees his own poetic imagination 
from any need of purgation. Or put differently, only on the condition that Virgil 
himself is represented as ethically perfect, can Dante also ground the claim that 
Virgil’s poetry is properly revelatory. Thus, on the one hand, Virgil’s ethical per-
fection provides him with a revelatory authority that exceeds that of Statius (at 
least in terms of the practical effects of their poetry); on the other hand, it appears 
that Statius’ spiritual awareness and recognition of the call to redemption allows 
him, as a penitent reader of divine signs rather than as a model of earthly, poetic 
auctoritas, a kind of authority that Virgil expresses but cannot himself recognize.9 
But what is not addressed explicitly in this canto is the question of how is it that 
by reading Virgil, the inferior poet, Statius, had been able in his earthly state to 
draw upon the revelatory authority that the superior poet does not. The representa-
tions Dante offers us do not seem to make sense, or at least what they theoretically 
disclose calls for scrutiny.
Dante offers a glimpse of an answer to this problem a few cantos earlier, in 
Purgatorio 17, where, speaking as a narrator, he claims:
 O imaginativa che ne rube 
 talvolta sì di fuor, ch’om non s’accorge 
 perché dintorno suonin mille tube, 
 chi move te, se ’l senso non ti porge? 
 Moveti lume che nel ciel s’informa, 
 per sé o per voler che giù lo scorge. (13-18)
[O imagination, that sometimes so steals us from the outside that 
we do not hear although a thousand trumpets sound around us, 
who moves you if sense gives you nothing? A light moves you 
that is formed in the heavens, by itself or by a will that sends 
it down.]
This narration seems to suggest that, on the assumption that our earthly beatitude is 
subordinate in value to our spiritual beatitude, the authority of philosophical guid-
ance must also be subordinate to that of revelatory imagination. Viewed from this 
perspective, the purpose of the Commedia would be to inspire correct belief (or to 
articulate a theology), and it would also appear to be the case that Dante believes 
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that the tool most appropriate for this purpose would not be philosophy but poetic 
representation. Accordingly, the Commedia’s images of the souls of the damned 
and saved alike would seem to be offered in order to produce in Dante’s readers 
a revelation of “quella fede che vince ogne errore” (Inferno 4.48) [“that faith that 
vanquishes every error”]. And yet, while this reading suggests that the relation-
ship between philosophy and revelation proceeds directly from the subordination 
of earthly happiness to spiritual beatitude, were we to ascertain what revelation 
means—to distinguish true revelation from fraudulent revelation—what would 
be the theoretical basis of our distinction? In other words, what is the nature of 
revelation and what distinguishes the author of the Commedia (the one who writes 
what seems to be a prophetic poem but who can also see the light that the poem 
contains) from the author of the Aeneid (an author who writes a prophetic poem 
but who nevertheless fails to see the light that the poem contains)? 
If we shift our attention to how Dante positions himself as author of the 
Commedia in relationship to both Statius and Virgil, the episode with Statius tells 
us that, intrinsically, Dante’s poetry and Virgil’s reveal the same truth despite the 
fact that Dante’s poetry, unlike Virgil’s, is also capable of extrinsically marking 
its intrinsic truth. And yet these extrinsic markers of Dante’s understanding of 
how revelatory experience operates disclose an aporia at the heart of what would 
otherwise constitute the ground for the subordination of philosophical to relevatory 
authority. This perplexing structure of subordination—different from and more 
complicated than the reasons offered for the subordination of temporal to spiritual 
ends of human action—becomes pressing when we turn our attention, for instance, 
to Dante’s introduction of Geryon, a representation of the very nature of fraud, at 
the end of Inferno 16:
 Sempre a quel ver c’ha faccia di menzogna 
 de’ l’uom chiuder le labbra fin ch’el puote, 
 però che sanza colpa fa vergogna; 
 ma qui tacer nol posso; e per le note 
 di questa comedìa, lettor, ti giuro, 
 s’elle non sien di lunga grazia vòte, 
 ch’i’ vidi per quell’ aere grosso e scuro 
 venir notando una figura in suso, 
 maravigliosa ad ogne cor sicuro… (124-132)
[Always to that truth that has the face of mendacity a man should 
close his lips as long as he can, for without guilt it makes him 
ashamed, but here I cannot keep silent, and by the notes of this 
comedy, reader, I swear to you, so that they may not fail to be 
marked for long favor, that I saw through that thick and dark 
air come swimming up a figure, awesome to the most confident 
heart…]
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Here, near the center of the Inferno, Dante tells us that the veracity of the extrinsic 
signification must be called into question: he should be ashamed, he tells us, to tell 
us a truth that bears the face of falsehood, but since the theoretical insight that he 
is disclosing to us is presupposed as exceeding the proper scope of natural reason, 
only this kind of “non falso errore” (Purgatorio 15.117) is capable of revealing 
and transmitting the insight. In other words, Dante suggests that he wants us to 
imagine that he saw what he is describing so that we will then believe the poem’s 
intrinsic referent, and that furthermore, the intrinsic referents for all of the images 
of the Commedia are their spiritual analogs. Consequently, the veracity of each 
representation is guaranteed not by its correspondence with what is literally signi-
fied, but by its allegorical referent. 
A similar strategy seems to me to be at work in Dante’s emphasis in Paradiso 
33 on his failure to capture in words and in memory his pilgrim’s exalted vision of 
the Trinity. These passages in the final canto of the Commedia rely on the inverse 
of the tactic at work in the passage introducing Geryon. Whereas in the former 
example the poetic representation is accomplished through a non-false error, in 
Paradiso 33 the strategy seems to be to reinforce the illusion that the pilgrim saw 
what he saw precisely by insisting that the vision could never have been represented 
and can no longer even be recalled by the author with clarity. But these passages 
also therefore compel the same conclusion: that the veracity of the Commedia is 
rooted in its capacity to represent something that is simultaneously acknowledged 
as beyond the limits of representation. What is different from the introduction of 
Geryon is only that, in this case, the poetry provides a successful representation 
of its allegorical referent by explaining the way in which the explicitly identified 
sensory referents would necessarily be beyond the limits of intellectual comprehen-
sion, not to mention veridical representation. 
Still these claims about Dante’s tactical deployment of poetic representation 
are not, I believe, to be read merely as confirmation for the familiar conclusion 
that Dante is endorsing a mystical theology that trumps every claim of natural 
reason to be able to guide us to our respective beatitudes. In fact, I maintain that 
reading the Commedia in this way neglects an important insight that is demanded 
by the poem’s disclosure of the aporetic structure of revelation’s claim to author-
ity, namely that the internal logic of appeals to revelatory authority in no way 
undermines or supersedes the authority of natural reason but, rather, relies on it. 
First, because, as the episode with Statius shows, the internal logic of revelation 
requires that philosophy’s guidance also refer to the same intrinsic truth that the 
poetic representation does, Dante compels us to recognize philosophy’s legitimate 
authority not only as self-sufficient for guiding us to our earthly beatitude but also 
as a path that opens onto the revelatory experience that might secure a spiritual 
beatitude. Consequently, in the pilgrim’s response in Paradiso 26 to John the 
Apostle’s question concerning what has turned the pilgrim’s will to the Good (cited 
above), we see that there is a sense in which the relationship between the author-
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ity of philosophical arguments and revelatory experience cannot be one in which 
philosophy remains simply subordinate to revelation, even if, as I implied above, 
Dante does not, in fact, place these authorities on equal standing. Put differently, 
what Virgil, for instance, would be capable of recognizing is not merely consonant 
with what authentic revelatory experience would reveal; rather, the authority of the 
revelatory intention of Virgil’s poetry (which Virgil is nevertheless unable to see) is 
sufficiently, albeit aporetically, grounded in nothing other than Virgil’s recognition 
of the authority of natural reason. 
Thus, it appears that two incompatible claims subtend Dante’s understand-
ing of the relationship between philosophical and revelatory authorities. On the 
one hand, it is clear that Dante’s own point of view is that Virgil’s recognition of 
the authority of natural reason depends upon the fact that natural reason is itself 
authoritative only because it allows human beings an intellectual access to the love 
that governs the created world, and, in this sense—that is, from the perspective of 
the source and terminus of natural desire (see esp.  Purgatorio 17)—Dante must, 
of course, insist upon the subordination of natural reason to revelation. On the 
other hand, if Virgil’s authority can indeed disclose a revelatory path to spiritual 
happiness—even of a path of which Virgil is himself unaware—then revelation’s 
capacity to guide human action depends not upon a mystical insight that descends 
to the imagination from above but is, rather, sufficiently grounded in natural rea-
son’s employment of earthly experience to light a path or paths to both earthly and 
spiritual beatitudes. 
It is for this reason, I think, that, in the Convivio, when Dante explicitly ad-
dresses the question of the way in which the beauty of Lady Philosophy relates 
not merely to the secondary happiness associated with moral perfection but also 
to the primary happiness of Paradise, he has already anticipated the Commedia’s 
perplexing understanding of the relationship between philosophy and revelation. 
Lo sguardo di questa donna fu a noi così largamente ordinato, 
non pur per la faccia che ella ne dimostra, vedere, ma per le 
cose che ne tiene celate desiderare ad acquistare. Onde, sì come 
per lei molto di quello si vede per ragione, e per consequente si 
vede poter essere, che sanza lei pare maraviglia, così per lei si 
crede ogni miracolo in più alto intelletto pote[r] avere ragione, 
e per consequente pote[r] essere. Onde la nostra buona fede ha 
sua origine; dal[la] quale viene la speranza, ch’è ’l proveduto 
desiderare; e per quella nasce l’operazione della caritade. Per le 
quali tre virtudi si sale a filosofare a quelle Atene celestiali dove 
li Stoici e Peripatetici e Epicurî, per la luce della veritade etterna, 
in uno volere concordevolemente concorrono. (3.14.13-15; see 
also 3.7.15-16)
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[The sight of this lady was so generously granted to us in order 
not only that we might see her face, which she reveals to us, but 
that we might desire to acquire those things which she keeps 
hidden from us. For just as because of her much is perceived 
by our reason, and consequently it becomes comprehensible, 
which without her would seem miraculous, so because of her 
it becomes believable that every miracle can be perceived by a 
superior intellect to have a reasonable cause and, consequently, 
to have the power to exist. Our good faith has its origin in this, 
from which comes the hope that longs for things foreseen; and 
from this springs the activity of charity. By these three virtues 
we ascend to philosophize in that celestial Athens where Stoics 
and Peripatetics and Epicureans, by the light of eternal truth, join 
ranks in a single harmonious will.] (emphasis added)
But what the Convivio makes all too clear—that the authority of revelation 
in fact depends upon the authority of philosophy—also reveals another, yet more 
interesting point, the stakes of which are raised to a new pitch in the Commedia. 
As I have already suggested above, interpreted one way, philosophy intrinsically 
signifies the same truth that would be revealed in any authentic mystical experience. 
Interpreted another way, however, this point explains why philosophy’s practical 
authority is defended only by imposing severe limitations on its speculative ambi-
tions. That is, philosophy cannot lay claim to the authority that it lends to revela-
tion. In short, even while philosophy is the grounds for the authority of revelation, 
it nevertheless cannot provide any authoritative justification for the faith or hope 
that remains both the substance of revelation and a condition of the possibility 
of achieving a spiritual beatitude. The representation to ourselves of what would 
give cause for faith or hope may be consistent with principles acquired through 
natural reason, but natural reason only points the way to something that remains 
necessarily excessive of its legitimate scope of understanding. 
This thought is, to a certain extent, the crux of what I think ought to be ex-
plored at greater length than I can do in the remainder of this essay, but recapitulating 
my initial framing of the issue ought to help identify the scope and significance 
of this problem. I began by noting that Dante’s utmost political concern lies in 
defending the independence of secular political authority against ecclesiastical 
encroachments. But, this political concern is, I think, not only Dante’s utmost 
concern altogether, but is also the source of one way in which Dante continues 
to be relevant to the very canon in which he is revered as l’altissimo poeta. This 
is why it is not only important that we understand why Dante intends to defend 
philosophy’s authority as universally compelling, but also why it may be of some 
relevance to us to understand the means of this defense through the demarcation 
of philosophy’s proper scope to the domain of ethics. I shall therefore conclude by 
suggesting what I think is at stake in this demarcation and defense of philosophy’s 
authority.
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Whether deliberately or not, Dante troubles his own authorial status in the 
Commedia and so, to a certain extent, de-authorizes what seems to be the explicit 
justification for interpreting the text as prophetic since, among other reasons, proph-
ecy (unlike myth, perhaps) hardly ever tries to claim its authority as strategically 
as Dante does. But what I think is more philosophically interesting in this textual 
strategy is that by making his readers responsible for interpreting and transmitting 
his text, Dante effectively deauthorizes or displaces the role of belief (and hence 
also the role of theology) in human affairs in favor of the significance of practice 
and by devaluing the importance of metaphsyics in favor of the importance of 
ethics. Understood in this way, it is not at all surprising to note that the Commedia 
frequently introduces unorthodox and sometimes even explicitly heterodox im-
ages to mobilize such a philosophical perspective.10 But with respect to the ques-
tion of philosophy’s authority, what this seems to suggest is that, although Dante 
theoretically subordinates the authority of philosophy to revelation in terms of the 
ultimate ends of human nature, in terms of the question of practice, he inverts this 
subordination. 
Consequently, even were we to accept the reality of salvation—which under-
lies the extrinsic signification of Dante’s insistence on the subordination of ethical 
to spiritual teloi of human nature—then our salvation would nonetheless depend 
upon the separation of powers and the guidance of philosophy in order to prepare 
us to receive the revelation necessary for salvation. But then, by the same token, 
in terms of our legitimate practical concerns to achieve both temporal and spiritual 
beatitudes, are we not also therefore compelled to read Dante’s extrinsic represen-
tations of the possibility of our salvation as subordinate fictions that “reveal” to 
us the authoritative status of secular political rule and the philosophical guidance 
that lights the path(s) to any of our actually possible beatitudes? Or, in short, even 
though Dante must as a consequence of the theological framework for the Com-
media represent even “il maestro di color che sanno” (“the master of those who 
know,” Inferno 4.131), as living in “duol sanza martìri” (“grief without torture,” 
Inferno 4.28), at the same time, I am inclined to think that the aporetic structure of 
revelatory authority in the Commedia also allows us to conclude that it does not 
really matter whether the extrinsic significance of Aristotle’s infernal condition 
is theoretically or theologically correct. Indeed, the question of the theological 
accuracy of the depiction of Aristotle in Limbo is hardly relevant to the question 
of how the text aims to produce a revelatory experience that would be relevant to 
securing the spiritual end posited by its theological framework. That is, the formal 
structure of the Commedia may rest upon a theological presupposition that is to 
some extent irrelevant to its implicit purpose, since the text’s more important in-
sights require a shift from their spiritual referents to their deliberative value—their 
ethical or political value as opposed to their theological or metaphysical value.11
In any case, to reinforce and summarize the more limited claims offered 
above, I hope to have shown that, although he may have intended to suggest that 
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the superiority of revelation over philosophical authority derives from the supe-
riority of spiritual over earthly ends of human action, Dante in fact shows that 
revelation does not derive its authority from any intellectually unmediated access 
to divine truth. Even in his “poema sacro” (Paradiso 25.1), Dante’s representations 
of what are offered as transcendent truths can guide human action only by being 
accessed through interpretive activities that always end up relying upon earthly 
experience mediated by human reason. Hence, the very recourse to revelation 
(and so, too, the assertion of its authority) turns out to depend upon philosophical 
insight. Only philosophy—understood as a primarily ethico-political rather than a 
metaphysical preoccupation—can provide the authority Dante intends to assign to 
revelation. Consequently, it is impossible to avoid the conclusion that revelatory 
authority is nothing but a product—albeit a practically necessary one if humans 
are, as Dante suggests, ontologically oriented toward the practical importance of 
signifying to themselves the possibility of their own spiritual beatitude—of phi-
losophy’s authority exceeding its own legitimate scope. In short, then, revelation’s 
authority as practical guide to spiritual beatitude is only aporetically grounded in 
philosophy’s otherwise legitimate and carefully demarcated scope of authority as 
practical guidance.
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without the divine light of Revelation that transcends it. That is why, in Dante 
as in Aristotle, the contemplative life is less human than the divine, but for a 
reason quite different from that which forms the basis of Aristotle’s thesis” 
(p. 138). However, while I accept Gilson’s claim about the primacy of eth-
ics in Dante’s philosophical agenda, it should be noted that Gilson reaches a 
different conclusion than I will offer below concerning the independence of 
philosophy’s authority from that of revelation.
9 Albert Russell Ascoli’s recent Dante and the Making of a Modern Author 
(Cambridge, 2009) provides a masterful analysis of Dante’s appeals to and 
transformations of a variety of traditional understandings of “authority.” My 
own claims about Dante’s role as an authority for his readers are much more 
limited, and, in this essay, I am ultimately more concerned with Dante’s un-
derstanding of the nature of philosophical and revelatory authority than I am 
with his own poetic strategies to harness any particular form of authority.
10 Just one among many instances of Dante’s unorthodoxy is his suggestion in 
Paradiso 32 that the blessed are divided equally between those who lived before 
Christ and those who lived after. As for an example of outright heterodoxy, 
one of Dante’s more interesting claims occurs in Inferno 33.121-147, where 
Fra Alberigo explains to the pilgrim that a soul that commits a truly heinous 
crime may be brought to the underworld even before the death of the body (the 
14 Jason Aleksander
animating spirit of the body is replaced by a demonic one), a notion, that, were 
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